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WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

MEDICAL AID FOR CHILDREN WITHOUT PARENTAL CONSENT
It has long been recognized, as a general statement of law, that a court
possesses the power under certain conditions to substitute its authority for
that of the authority of a child's parents.' The substantive considerations
and procedures which a court employs to take temporary custody of a child
for purposes of medical treatment remain a controversial segment of the
law, though these substantive considerations and procedures spring from
the ancient and unquestioned doctrine of parens patriae. Where a child
is thought to be in need of immediate medical care, and the parents have
failed or will not agree to provide treatment, it becomes crucial that the
case be placed before the appropriate court or quasi-judicial body as soon
as possible, and procedure assumes added importance.
Speaking in terms of substantive law, there are diverse reasons why
medical treatment is not provided by parents, and dealing with these
reasons becomes troublesome when they are advanced as affirmative defenses for the parent's failure to act. If the lack of medical treatment is
simply a result of poverty or actual neglect, the courts have little trouble
in disposing of the problem. However, if the lack of necessary medical
care is the result of the religious or personal philosophies of otherwise
attentive parents, the difficult question that confronts the courts is
whether under those conditions lack of medical care constitutes neglect
within the purview of the statutes dealing with juvenile problems. Further,
the courts must answer the question of whether enforcement of medical
treatment over the religious or personal objections of the parents conflicts
with the constitutional guarantees of religious and personal freedom . Also
to be taken into consideration is the seriousness of the child's illness and
the degree of danger involved in treatment.
In order best to discuss the procedures and substantive considerations
involved in judicial insistence upon medical care for children in the face
of parental objection, it is necessary to view the problem in connection
with the underlying parens patriae powers of the state. The state is considered an institution for the good of the citizen and his children, and
the state as parens patriae may exercise parental care and authority in
2
order that the child may best be prepared for citizenship and adult life.
Statutes to this end are an embodiment of the duty of the state as guardian
and protector of children where other guardianship fails.3 Absolute power
is not implicit in parental right to the custody of the child, but this right
4
This power
is a trust placed in the parent by the state as parens patriae.
of the state is not unlimited, but equity courts have the power to intervene
and take custody from the parents, under certain circumstances, and to
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In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 871, Ann.Cas. 1915E 1022 (1945).
Wisconsin Industrial School for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 79 N.W. 422
(1899).
Gardner v. Hall, 132 N.J.Eq. 64, 26 A.2d 799 (1942).

NOTEs

place the minor in the custody of an institution or third person, the best
interests of the minor being the most important consideration. 5
The doctrine of parens patriae has been one of influence and vitality
throughout the history of Anglo-American law, but its use as doctrinaire
justification for taking temporary custody for the purposes of a medical
operation or treatment is relatively new. In partial explanation of this
somewhat late development it perhaps can be said that it was necessary
for medical science to develop a substantial degree of reliability before a
court having equitable powers felt justified in overriding parental dictates,
especially when the treatment involved a degree of risk. Changing sociological concepts and public policy are further explanations for this change.
The greater concern of the courts today in the health and well-being of
infants is not evidence of increasing socialistic tendencies, but is rather an
emphasis on benefit to the individual, with a benefit to the state accruing
only as a secondary and inevitable result.
It is held that statutes under which medical treatment is given to
children in the face of religious objections of the parents do not violate
the constitutional right of freedom of religion. 6 Certain religious sects
have interpreted passages in the Bible as being an injunction against
various kinds of medical treatment.7 In Prince v. United States,8 a child
was distributing religious pamphlets on the street. Although accompanied
by her adult guardian, it was held that the right to practice religion freely
does not include the liberty to expose the community or child to communicable disease or the child to ill health and death, and a state could
prohibit such practices by statutes designed to protect the health and
welfare of its citizens. The opinion stated:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full
and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves. 9
Although this case does not bear directly on the issue of medical treatment
when objected to by parents, it expresses a philosophy applicable to situations where religious convictions bar medical care The Prince case was
cited in an Illinois determination of this precise issue. 10 The parents of a
child suffering from erythroblastosis fetalis" had refused, on religious
grounds, to permit a blood transfusion which medical opinion considered
necessary for the prevention of mental deficiency or possible death. The
court held that the Juvenile Court Act, 12 providing for court aid upon a
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Arnold v. Arnold, 246 Ala. 86: 18 So.2d 730 (1944).
In re Vasko, 238 App.Div. 128, 263 N.Y.Supp. 552 (1933).
For examples of Biblical passages interpreted as forbidding blood transfusions, see
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showing that the child was "neglected" (one which "has not proper parental
care") was constitutional. The lack of medical care, even though a result
of the parent's religious beliefs, constituted the child neglected and she
therefore lacked proper parental care as defined in the statute. The test
of proper parental care has been said to be that which a reasonable and
prudent parent would do under the same or similar circumstances. 13 In a
Texas case, 14 under a similarly worded statute,1 5 a child suffering from
what was thought to be arthritis or complications following rheumatic fever
was not given medical aid by its mother. The mother did not think
orthodox medical care was necessary because of her prayers and religious
ministrations. The court held that what an individual may consider a
higher authority must yield to the law of the land where a duty to provide
medical treatment is involved; peculiarities of belief as to proper forms
of treatment, however honestly entertained, are not necessarily a lawful
excuse. The appellate court did not disturb the jury finding of neglect,
and affirmed the award of custody to the Chief Juvenile Officer so that
medical aid could be given. The court pointed out that the award was
not permanent, but would yield to changing conditions; for example,
reasonable cooperation by the parent.
The case of In re Hudson6 held that if parents show unfitness and
the child is exposed to immoral or debasing conditions, the court can
take custody; however, the court has no right to intercede over the objections of the parents and force medical treatment when these objections are
based on the parents' belief that the operation might result in the child's
death. Denial of medical treatment under these conditions did not constitute the child "destitute" or its home "unfit" by reason of neglect of the
parents, within the meaning of the statute.' 7 In the Hudson case the
appellate court declined to order an amputation without parental consent
for a twelve year old girl whose congenitally malformed arm was ten times
its normal size. Medical opinion in the case revealed that there was a
fair degree of risk, but amputation was recommended. The size of the
malformed arm, it was testified, caused a generally weak condition which
made the girl proie to infection due to the demands on her heart. The
mother objected because of what she considered to be the risk involved,
although the father seemed willing to let the court assume his responsibility
for a decision. The appellate court, in a four to three decision, reversed the
lower court's order directing amputation. The majority reasoned that
although the mother objected to the operation because she felt it was too
dangerous, the mother was otherwise a fit parent, and a court of equity
had no power to take custody over such objections and subject the child
to an operation that might residt in death. The court implied that such
power could lead to a court order permitting euthanasia or mercy killing.
13.
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In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1941).
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The lower court in the Hudson case had held that this failure to provide
medical treatment came within the purview of the Washington statute
which contains a requirement similar to that of Texas and Illinois.
The dissenting opinion in the Hudson case stressed that parental
duty had been shirked in two ways: first, in failure to provide medical
care; and second, in failure to heed the advice of professional men. Medical attention, said the dissent, is a necessary1s without which a child is
destitute within the meaning of the statute. The minority of the court
felt that the clearly apparent psychological effect caused by the malformed
arm and the child's inability to participate in normal life were strong
arguments for ordering the amputation where such operation did not
involve more than a fair degree of risk.
The outlook for the success or failure of the proposed operation is
perhaps the most powerful factor that the court must consider. In England
in 1914, relatively early in the history of modern surgical technique, the
court held that parental refusal to allow an adenoid operation could have
been found to constitute a failure to provide adequate medical aid. The
father of the child objected because of a certain amount of risk involved.
This was held to be no excuse where in actuality the operation was minor
and the risk was negligible.1 9 In the case of Morrison v. State,20 reliable
medical opinion indicated that death would inevitably result from lack of
medical care, and the parents would not consent to the giving of a blood
transfusion because of religious beliefs and the risk involved. The court
did not hesitate to order that the necessary medical care be furnished,
pointing to the fact that a blood transfusion, done by a competent technician, is almost devoid of any risk to life. A greater degree of risk
was involved in the proposed amputation of the malformed arm in the
Hudson case, but it should be born in mind that the expert testimony
described this as only a fair degree of risk and recommended surgery. The
problem seems to resolve itself into the question of whether the court
should weigh most heavily the opinion of medical witnesses or the
opinions and wishes of the parents. The court in the Morrison case
specifically declined to follow the Hudson decision, and relied most heavily
on the medical prognosis given by the expert witnesses. Thus it can be
seen that the two cases are distinguishable on more than merely the
differing degree of risk involved. In dealing with the question of outlook
for success or failure, the Washington court was apparently willing to give
more weight to the opinion and wishes of the parents than to the expert
testimony of physicians, even where risk of death was not substantial and
continued life without an attempt at treatment was doubtful.
It has been held that statutes providing for compulsory vaccination. are
constitutional. The case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts21 declared that
18.
19.
20.
21.

For collected cases holding that medical attention is a necessary, see 71 A.L.R. 227.

Oakey v. Jackson, 1 K.B. 216 (1914).

252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952).
197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643, 3 Ann.Cas. 765 (1904).
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provision for compulsory small-pox vaccination is a legitimate exercise
of the police power of the state. The penalty for non-compliance with
this statute requiring medical treatment in the form of immunization
against small-pox was a monetary fine. In later cases, 22 statutes and resolutions of school and health boards requiring vaccination before the child
will be permitted to attend school have been upheld. 23 The withholding
of the-privilege to attend school is an example of a coercive remedy that in
most cases will work without resort to any court action. Part of the reasoning behind such statutes is that parents will consent to vaccination if to
object means a deprivation of their children's right to education.
The procedure for judicial termination of parental rights is generally
well established by statute. 24 Once the substantive questions as discussed
in the paragraphs above are resolved in favor of medical treatment, and
life depends on quick medical aid, the procedures must necessarily be
speedy. In Wyoming, a petition is filed in the district court by the county
attorney or other interested party alleging that the child has been abandoned or that the parent is unfit by reason of his or her neglect. 25 A jury
trial may be demanded by any parent, child, or interested party, and
constructive service may be had against any non-resident parent, although
no judgment or decree can be entered without a hearing. 26 The Wyoming
statute further provides that upon determining that it is in the best
interests of the child, the rights of the parents are terminated and a suitable
person is appointed to serve as guardian. Further, upon the application
of any parent, the court may order transfer of the permanent care and
custody of the child. Thus it is the parent's option to make the transfer
a permanent status. Jurisdiction in these proceedings is based on residence
of the child.2 7 Illustrating the flexibility of the decree, under Illinois
statutory provisions similar to those of Wyoming, a guardian was appointed
with orders to see that the medical treatment was performed. After
treatment, the guardian was discharged and the child was returned to its
parents. 2 8 As a further illustration of procedural fexibility, it has been
held that the child, where mentally old enough to understand what benefits the treatment would provide, be acquainted with the benefits of
22.
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Mosier v. Barren County Board of Health, 309 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948);
Sadlock v. Board of Education, 137 N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948).
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by the parents. Dewitt v. Brooks, 143 Tex. 687, 182 S.W.2d 687 (1944).
Accord, ex parte Kernon, 272 N.Y. 560, 4 N.E.2d 737 (1936).
618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1951).
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the operation by a reasonable number of qualified persons and be
permitted to decide for himself, the parent being restrained from interfering with such discussions. Also, the expenses incurred were to be
29
charged to the father if he was found to be financially able to pay.
The situation may be summarized as follows: generally speaking, the
state has power to take permanent or temporary custody of children under
its powers of parens patriae for the purpose of seeing that they receive
needed medical treatment. Statutes under which this power is exercised,
even in the face of parental objection based on religious belief, are constitutional. Denial of medical care constitutes neglect; peculiarities of
belief as to proper treatment are not necessarily a lawful excuse. The
possibility of success or failure of the proposed treatment is a powerful
consideration. Where medical opinion indicates that treatment involves
a substantial degree of risk, there is a conflict of authority as to whether
the decision should be left to the parents. However, where continued life
without treatment is doubtful, the opinion of expert witnesses, though in
no way binding, is carefully weighed and is usually persuasive. Statutes
denying education privileges to students unless the students comply and
submit to vaccination have been upheld. Such statutes are an example
of a coercive remedy through which the treatment is usually accomplished
without resort to the courts.
Once neglect has been established, the judge has much discretion in
ordering the kind of treatment to follow. Generally, an order for treatment contemplates the return of the child to its natural parents when
medical care has been accomplished. Ordinarily a county or court officer
is appointed as guardian and given the responsibility of seeing that the
treatment is carried out.
Although unreasonable publicity should not be given to individual
cases, it is of great importance that it be made known to the public its
responsibility to call to the attention of the court the fact that a child is
being neglected.
W. K. ARCHIBALD
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